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Abstract 
In terms of economics, individuals divorce if their expected gains from marriage fall short of their 
expected utility outside the current marriage, and children represent a marriage-specific type of 
investment, which generally increases the value of marriage for the spouses. However, children may also 
disrupt marital stability as they will induce dramatic changes into the household allocation of money and 
time. In particular, children conceived before or after first marriage may be valued differently by the 
spouses and this may lead to marital conflicts. It is difficult to assign a priori the direction of the effect of 
children on marriage stability, and causality may run either way, as couples who anticipate a separation 
are more likely to have fewer children than those who are happy together, while children born before first 
marriage may be associated with a lower marriage attachment of their parents. Here, we follow an 
empirical approach and take advantage of the richness of the data on pre-marital history from the 24 
waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth79, to estimate the effect of children conceived 
before or after first marriage on marital stability. We find a significant deterrent effect of young children 
conceived during first marriage to the likelihood of divorce, while children conceived before first 
marriage are found to have a disruptive effect on marital stability.  
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1. Introduction 
In spite of the trend towards falling divorce rates in the U.S (see Figure 1), currently 
about one of every five white Americans has gone through a divorce. Among the 
determinants of divorce, the presence of children has attracted considerable attention in 
the economic literature (Stevenson and Wolfers 2006; 2007; Svarer and Verner 2008; 
Vuri 2001; Waite and Lillard 1993). According to the mainstream economic models, an 
individual decides to marry if the expected gains (emotional, monetary, and other) from 
marriage exceed the gains of remaining single. Children are generally thought of as 
making marriage more valuable to the spouses, as they represent a long-term 
commitment (that can be seen also as a form of long-term investment in the marriage 
relationship) which may reinforce marriage stability. On the other hand, children may 
bring about marital conflict by affecting dramatically the household allocation of time 
and money and contributing a degree of uncertainty, as children’s preferences and 
behavior are not known to parents ex-ante. Children can be seen as a ‘public’ household 
good that both spouses enjoy, but they may also be seen as competitors for scarce time 
and money resources (Del Bono et al. 2012) and in this respect could be a hindrance to 
marital stability. Children conceived outside marriage may have different preferences 
and behaviors than those conceived after the couple married, as for example, they may 
have experienced some hardship at an early stage of their life, or they may be hostile to 
the (step) parent, if they come from an earlier relationship. In particular, children 
conceived before first marriage may also be valued differently by the spouses and this 
may bring about marital conflict. The aim of our study is to provide new empirical 
evidence of these relationships by exploiting the richness of information collected by 
the NLSY79.  
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The relationship between children and marriage stability is crucial, as most policy 
makers in OECD countries aim to increase population fertility rates, to counter 
population ageing.1 However, if the presence of children is viewed as an obstacle to 
marriage stability, the costs for society may be high, as the costs of divorce for 
divorcees and for their children have been widely documented (Amato 2004; Smock 
1993; 1994).   
Let us stress that the spouses’ ‘value’ of marriage is not exogenous to the decision 
to have children. Happier couples are more likely to have children, and the timing of 
children, before or after marriage, may also depend on spousal attitudes to marriage and 
cohabitation, which may in turn affect their propensity to separate. Thus, we adopt an 
instrumental variable and panel data approach to study the relationship between children 
conceived before and after the first marriage, and the risk of marital disruption. We 
exploit the extensive information on the pre- and post-marital history of a sample of 
American youth collected by the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79), of which twenty-four waves are currently available.2 Since we can observe 
the same individual (the same couple) many times, we can control for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity in our model. Because the number of children conceived 
before or after first marriage may not be independent of individual propensity to 
divorce, we take an instrumental variable approach. We instrument the number of 
children conceived during first marriage with the number of siblings of the respondent 
(as we expect that individuals who grow up in larger families may be more likely to 
have more children (Booth and Kee 2006)) and, alternatively, with multiple births, that 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1 See, for instance, Bielecki et al. (2015) for an analysis of the role of pension reforms under different scenarios of 
decreasing fertility and increasing longevity. Alders (2005) studies the effects of exogenous fertility shocks on human 
capital accumulation and the rate of obsolescence of older workers. Fanti and Spataro (2013) investigate the 
relationship between public debt and fertility. Lau (2014) analyzes the economic consequences of fertility and 
mortality changes by incorporating realistic demographic features into a continuous-time overlapping-generations 
model, with childhood, adulthood and retirement stages. 
2 Rotz (2011) uses similar data to investigate the determinants of declining divorce rates in the U.S. 
4"
"
represent a somewhat exogenous increase in family size (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
1980). We find that children conceived during first marriage dramatically reduce the 
risk of marital dissolution. The chances of divorce decline with each additional child by 
0.19 on average, which is a sizable effect.3 Moreover, we find that the presence of 
children conceived before first marriage, instrumented with the age at first intercourse, 
has a positive effect on divorce, though smaller in size (about half) than the protective 
effect of children conceived within marriage.    
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
background theory, and Section 3, the empirical strategy. In Section 4, we describe the 
data and the sample selection. The results of estimations are presented in Section 5, and 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6.  
 
2. The theoretical set-up 
The economic model of marriage predicts that individuals marry if the expected value 
of being married exceeds that of remaining single and there is a marriage surplus that 
spouses will share and benefit from. Marriage separation will occur when, due to 
(unexpected) shocks, the value of being married drops below that of separation for 
either one or both spouses (depending on whether unilateral divorce is available, and 
more generally, on the divorce laws).  Economic models of marriage and divorce focus 
on the ‘value’ of marriage. Individuals marry because there are gains from marriage. 
Such gains may be emotional, like love and affection, as well as economic, such as 
sharing economic and time resources together (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993; 2003). 
Formally, to model the individual decision to separate, we must model the 
individual value function of being married to the current spouse (Vm), and of separating 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
3 The divorce rate is about 0.37 in our dataset, where more than one of every three marriages ends in divorce. A 
similar divorce rate for first marriages, equal to 34%, is recorded by Waite and Lillard (1993) for the PSID sample. 
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from them (Vs), which depend on the utility of consumption and on an uncertainty term 
(which may also capture random shocks or tastes) under the two states of marriage and 
separation, while being subject to budget and time constraints. Thus, we first express:  
Vmj (Cmj , Cm, Hm, um)  with j = h, w denoting the two spouses                 (1)  
considering that Hm=f(z, tjunpaid) denotes the output of household production, 
tjpaid+tjunpaid+tjleisure = T indicates each spouse’s time constraint, and 
thpaid*Wh+twpaid*Ww+Ynlh+Ynlw = Cmh+Cmw+pz+Cm, is the household budget constraint. 
Similarly, we express: 
Vsj (Csj, Cs, Hs, us)                                                                                        (2) 
with Hs= f(z, tjunpaid), tjpaid +tjunpaid+tjleisure = T, and tjpaid*Wj+Ynlj = Csj+Cs. 
The subscript m denotes the state of being married and s that of separation, and Cj 
represents private consumption, respectively in each of the two states m and s for each 
spouse j; C denotes public consumption (including expenditure incurred for children) 
and H is the output of the household production function (which also includes children, 
as well as home goods and services produced for children). As is conventional in 
household economic models, the output of household production is hard to measure but 
it is produced by combining goods z purchased from the market (at prices p), and 
spouses’ unpaid work time, tjunpaid. The output of household work may be consumed 
either privately (for example, a cup of coffee) or publicly (for example, a clean house).  
The typical characteristic of a public good is that it can be enjoyed (or disliked) by more 
than one person, such as, for example, a painting in the living room that one spouse 
adores and the other can barely tolerate – as opposed to eating an apple, which is 
deemed to be private consumption. The uncertainty term varies across the two states of 
the world for each spouse. For example, married individuals may be uncertain about the 
own or the spousal future health status, or may not be able to anticipate how they will 
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get on with their step-children, and so forth. Unmarried separated individuals may be 
uncertain about whether they will meet a new marriageable partner, or whether their 
children may suffer from the parental separation, and so on. The importance of 
uncertainty in determining the individual expected value of marriage relative to the 
value of being single (or the external options) has received considerable attention since 
the pioneering work of Becker et al. (1977). It should, perhaps, be added that the value 
of marriage for each spouse may well differ from the sum of the value of being single 
for each spouse, as marriage will generate certain extra surplus for the spouses, such as 
love, caring, children, or in the form of the output of household production, if there are 
technology gains to being married, and possibly also increasing economies of scale. 
Marriage may also generate some negative losses for one or both spouses, for example, 
in the event of one of the spouses becoming disabled or losing their job, or due to 
changes in the divorce or child custody laws. According to the economic model, 
individuals will separate if the expected value of marriage (E(Vjm)) falls short of the 
expected value of being single (E(Vsj)).  
 According to Becker’s model of the family (Becker 1981), children represent a 
marriage-specific investment, whose value is positively correlated with parental 
education (Black et al. 2005; Currie and Moretti 2003), which may contribute to making 
marriage more valuable to both spouses and thus, more stable. Children conceived 
before first marriage may have a different value for the spouses - for example, if one is a 
step-parent. Generally, the presence of children is likely to introduce a degree of 
uncertainty in the marital relationship, as for example, it is hard to anticipate whether 
the child will wake up often at night, or will fall sick on a certain day, or what their 
school grades will be, and parents may disagree on how to deal with these events. 
Children have their own preferences, which are usually unknown to the future parents, 
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and if parents care for their children, this fact alone may bring considerable uncertainty 
into the household allocation of time and money (i.e. private expenditure). Del Bono et 
al. (2012) show that parental behavior is substantially affected by the arrival of children. 
Parents may disagree on the children’s upbringing, which may lead to marital conflict 
(Svarer and Verner 2008; Vuri 2001; 2002), while the amount of leisure time that 
partners spend together often dramatically falls in couples with young children, making 
the marital relationship more fragile (Barnet-Verzat et al. 2011; Beblo 1999).  
In household economic models, children are considered as public goods (Friedberg 
and Stern 2003), a good that both parents enjoy.4 But children also affect the household 
decision-making and consumption, either directly (if they are viewed as having their 
own utility function that enters the household utility function) or indirectly, via the 
parents’ utility function. Spouses’ gains from marriage depend on spouses’ time 
allocation and consumption, which are both dramatically affected by the presence of 
children. Parents may disagree on how to allocate time and money to children. The 
presence of children is going to affect home production (H), as well as public (C) and 
private consumption (Cj) and the spouses’ allocation to paid (tpaid) and unpaid work 
(tunpaid). Children conceived before marriage may have different preferences and behave 
differently than those conceived after their parents married, for example, if they have 
experienced some hardship at an early stage of their life, or if they are resentful of their 
(step) parent. Finally, the presence of children may also change the spouses’ ‘outside 
options’, as parents will meet new people through their children such as doctors, 
babysitters, school teachers, as well as other parents, and so forth, and this may add to 
marriage instability.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
4"Other examples of public goods in household economic models are the home, heating, painting and decorating the 
living room wall. An example of private goods is the clothes consumed by each spouse."""
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Since marital stability and the presence and number of (young) children are 
generally positively associated, it is difficult to disentangle the direction of causality 
when studying the relationship between the number and age of children and parental 
divorce.5 Cultural and social norms may also affect both fertility decisions and marriage 
stability (Furtado et al. 2013; Sevilla-Sanz 2010).  
Earlier studies conclude that children have a protective effect on marriage, 
especially when they are young (Andersson 1997; Cherlin 1977). However, other 
authors, addressing the potential endogeneity of fertility in a marital stability model, 
come to mixed conclusions. For example, Koo and Janowitz (1983) conclude that the 
effect of fertility on divorce is insignificant. In contrast, Waite and Lillard (1993), using 
PSID data and modeling simultaneously the duration of marriage and the elapsed time 
before childbirth, find that the first child contributes positively to marital stability, 
whereas subsequent children have a negative effect. Steele et al. (2005) conclude that 
young children positively affect marital stability. Vuri (2001) instruments fertility with 
the gender of the first two children, finding that children have a negative impact on 
marital stability. Vuri (2002) also concludes that the sign of the relationship varies with 
the age of the child, with younger children having a positive effect on marital stability, 
and older ones a negative effect, in line with the argument that parents postpone divorce 
until the children are older. Svarer and Verner (2008), using census data for Denmark, 
estimate a bivariate duration model of marriage survival and time intervals to child-
birth, showing that the presence of children increases the risk of marital disruption, and 
especially so for the first and second children. Therefore, the earlier literature comes to 
controversial conclusions on the direction of the effect of the number and the age of 
children on marital disruption.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
5 Couples who anticipate divorce are less likely to have children (Myers 1997). 
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The literature is much less prolific on the effect of children conceived outside 
marriage on the stability of marriage. Earlier studies conclude that children born out-of-
wedlock, or from cohabiting parents, experience higher parental separation rates on 
average, even when those parents subsequently marry (Manning et al. 2004; Osborne et 
al. 2007). Lunberg and Rose (2003) find that the gender of the first child affects the 
marriage probability of mothers (of children born out-of-wedlock), which suggests that 
boys make marriage more valuable for fathers. Dahl and Moretti (2008) conclude that 
when the first child is a girl, mothers are less likely to marry; shotgun marriages are less 
likely to take place, while married parents are more likely to divorce. However, they 
also find that the number of children is considerably higher in families with first-born 
girls. The compositional effects of out-of-the-wedlock births in relation to increasing 
cohabitation trends in the U.S. are thoroughly investigated by Ermish (2009).  
In our sample of married youth, sixty percent of the couples conceived their 
children after marriage, while forty per cent did so before that event.6 Therefore, it 
seems unlikely that children conceived before marriage by parents who subsequently 
married were all ‘unplanned’ births. While the vast majority of couples wait to marry 
before having children, there is a sizable number of couples who only marry after 
having conceived a child. Since formal marriage requires a stronger commitment than 
cohabitation, expecting a baby may be the key fact that convinces the couple to make a 
stronger commitment and marry. Under this scenario, children born outside marriage 
may consolidate the union. On the other hand, if the children conceived before first 
marriage come from an earlier, different union, their presence may hinder marriage 
stability and lead to conflict, as the blood-parent and the step-parent may value them 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
6"This is in line with Lundberg and Pollak (2013) who show that cohabitation has become more and more common in 
the Unites States in recent times.  
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differently.7 Moreover, the non-residential parent of children born out-of-the-wedlock 
from an earlier union also tend to contribute to child upbringing and have their say 
(Ermish 2008; Ermisch and Pronzato 2008), which may add to marital conflict between 
the natural parent and the step-parent of the current union (our unit of observation).  
Here again, causality may run either way, as individuals who had children out-of-
wedlock (before first marriage) may be more likely to divorce (see, for a discussion, 
Waite and Lillard 1993).8 For example, they may value formal marriage less, or may not 
see children as a marriage-specific investment. Therefore, it is difficult to sign a priori 
the effect of children on marital stability and our approach will therefore be empirical. 
To disentangle causality from statistical correlation, we take an instrumental variable 
and panel data approach.   
 
3. The empirical model 
According to economic models of marriage and divorce, it is difficult to sign a priori the 
effect of the presence of children on marriage stability, and this may vary with the 
number, gender, and age of the child. Children conceived before and after first marriage 
may also have a different effect. Here we take an empirical approach, and specify a 
reduced-form model of the effect of children on the couple’s probability of divorce. 
Formally, let us assume that children conceived before or within first marriage linearly 
affect divorce as follows: "
Divorceit+1= β1 Children-withinit + β2 Children-beforeit + β3 Xit + αi + εit              (3) 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
7"Children born during cohabitation to couples who marry later may be valued as marriage-specific investments. We 
do not attempt here to model all these different categories of children and couples, but we control for couple-
unobserved effects in the model. "
8 Although cohabitation before marriage has become more common among younger U.S. generations (Lundberg and 
Pollak 2013), we do not model cohabitation here, as this is not an exogenous decision. We control for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity, which will also capture individual preferences for cohabitation before marriage, knowing 
that our sample only includes individuals at risk of divorce (see Data Section).""
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where Divorceit+1 is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual i divorces (or 
separates) in year t+1. Children-withinit represents the number of children conceived 
during first marriage by individual i up to year t, Children-beforeit is the number of 
children conceived before first marriage, and Xit is a vector of individual characteristics 
measured at time t, such as age, gender, race, charges of illegal activity during youth, 
presence of the respondent’s father during youth, own and partner’s level of education, 
controls for age differences between spouses, and region of residence. The errors of the 
equation contain a constant αi that captures individual unobserved heterogeneity (such 
as negative attributes that would make someone a less attractive long-term partner), and 
an error term, εit, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Since we control for the 
number of children and individual characteristics in year t, one year before recording the 
event of divorce (or separation), the covariates can be seen as ‘pre-determined’ with 
respect to the decision of marital disruption. Moreover, to account for the potential 
endogeneity (the fact that children may affect divorce, but divorce in turn also has an 
impact on the number of children conceived within first marriage), and to disentangle 
the direction of causality, we instrument the number of children with a series of 
variables related to the respondent’s youth. We also control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity by exploiting the repeated observations for the same individual in our 
data, as respondents were interviewed many times over several years. Thus, we specify 
an instrumental variable and panel data model as follows: 
Divorceit+1 = γ1 Children-withinit + γ2 Children-beforeit + γ3 Xit + λit                (4) 
Children-withinit = θ1 IV-withinit + θ2 Xit + µit                                               (5) 
Children-beforeit = θ3 IV-beforeit + θ4 Xit + ξit                                               (6) 
where IV stands for the instruments, which are correlated with the potentially 
endogenous variable, and exogenous with respect to the dependent variable in Eq. (4). 
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The errors can be decomposed into an individual specific effect and a normally-
distributed error term (as in Eq. (3) above).9  
3.1 Identification 
We here discuss the choice of instruments, and in the following section we report the 
results of formally testing their validity. We take an instrumental variable approach 
since causality may run both ways, as children may affect marital stability, but happier 
couples are also more likely to have children. Therefore, we instrument children with 
variables that we expect to affect the number of children but not the probability of 
marriage break up.  
 In particular, we instrument the number of children conceived before and within 
first marriage with a series of variables related to the respondent’s background, as 
follows. We use information on the number of siblings of the individual, and construct a 
series of dummies, respectively, for one, two, three, and four or more siblings (the 
reference group is individuals with no siblings). Individuals are likely to replicate the 
fertility behavior of their parents (as documented, for example, in Axinn et al. 1994; 
Booth and Kee 2006).10 We also use multiple births as instrument, measured by a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent had twins, triplets, or more during 
first marriage (Cáceres-Delpiano 2012). We expect the presence of an unplanned child 
(as a consequence of the multiple birth) to be exogenous to the probability of marital 
disruption (Jacobsen et al. 2001), since individuals may not be able to fully anticipate 
their chances of having a multiple birth.11 Moreover, we include a series of dummies for 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
9 Wherever possible, we check our results by including robust standard errors in our model, finding no significant 
differences from our main specification. 
10"Larger families are often associated with lower divorce rates, so that having more siblings could also capture the 
fact that the respondent grew up in an intact family. Under this scenario, the number of siblings would affect directly 
and negatively the chances of divorce. To distinguish the direct effect of siblings on the divorce rate from the indirect 
effect of siblings, the latter via children, we checked whether the number of siblings affected the respondent’s divorce 
rate in childless couples, and found no effect.     "
11"We tested whether multiple births affect directly the respondent’s divorce rate, and we found no significant effect.   ""
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the respondent’s age at first sexual intercourse.12 We account for whether interviewees 
had intimate relations before turning 16 years old, or between 16 and 18 years old, or 
after 18 (the reference group are individuals who had no intimate relation by the years 
1983-1985, when respondents were between 21 and 28 years old). We expect age at first 
intercourse to affect the probability that respondents have children before first marriage 
(Miller and Heaton 1991). According to other sources, the mean age of first intercourse 
after menarche for women aged 15-44 was 17.4 in 2002, and for men aged 15-44 was 
17.0, also in 2002 (Chandra et al. 2005; Martínez et al. 2006). 
  
4. Data 
We use data drawn from the American National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79) to estimate the model. This survey began in 1979, by sampling 12,686 
individuals born between 1957 and 1965 (aged between 14 and 22 in 1979), who were 
interviewed each following year until 1994, and every two years (in even-numbered 
years) since 1994, thus producing 24 waves to date. Detailed information was collected 
on individual family background, intimate relations, charges of illegal activities during 
youth, (pre)marital fertility, education, and labor market experience, as well as partner’s 
characteristics. We selected the sample of individuals for the analysis as follows: 
1. They married at some stage during the survey period.  
2. They were at least 21 years old when they married. We drop early marriages, for 
which the timing of marriage may not be independent of the individual 
schooling level. However, for sensitivity purposes, we also experiment by 
including all first marriages in the sample, regardless of the age of the 
respondent at marriage. 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
12"Although this"instrument may correlate with other unobservable individual characteristics that also affect divorce 
chances, we also control in our model for individual unobserved effects, thanks to the fact that we can observe the 
same individual over time.  
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3. We dropped higher order marriages (second, third…) from the analysis, as well 
as those few marriages that ended with the death of the spouse during the sample 
period. "
Our sample includes 5,574 individuals in their first marriage. Our dependent 
variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether the individual is (still) married, or 
divorced (or separated) at time t+1. The event of marital dissolution is defined as 
reporting being separated or divorced, as for example in Chan and Halpin (2002).  
The covariates are measured one year earlier, at time t. We know the month and 
year in which children were born, and the year and month of first marriage, so we can 
distinguish between children conceived before and during first marriage. We assume 
that children born before or during the first 8 months of the first marriage were 
conceived before marriage. It seems more likely that the pregnancy had already begun 
when the couple married than that the wife became immediately pregnant in the first 
month of marriage. However, for robustness purposes, we also re-estimate the main 
model, dropping from the sample individuals who gave birth in the first eight months of 
marriage, finding that our conclusions are unaffected. 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main sample. In Table 2, we split the 
sample between divorcees and individuals in intact first marriages, providing more 
descriptive statistics. Considering that individuals are repeatedly observed during their 
marriage, and only once when they are divorced, the proportion of first marriages 
ending in divorce during the survey period in our sample reaches 37%, that is to say, 
more than one in every three marriages ends in divorce. On average, respondents 
conceived one child during first marriage, while roughly 15% of the sample had 
(already) conceived a child before marriage. The mean age at first marriage of those 
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who later divorce is 24.5 years (Table 2), and the mean age at divorce is almost 32 
years, implying an average duration of first marriage of six to seven years.  
About 77% of the respondents are married to someone of the same age. In contrast, 
the husband is more than five years older than the wife in 19% of the cases. Almost 
25% of the sample has a college degree; over 31% have more than college education, 
while less than 7% have less than high school (less than intermediate education). Blacks 
account for 19% of the sample and Hispanics for 16%. As for geographical location, we 
distinguish four regions: North East (the reference category), North Central, South, and 
West.13 Finally, 7% of the survey participants in our sample were charged with some 
illegal activity in youth, within the first two years of the survey.    
For the subsample of intact marriages, the average age at first marriage is very 
similar to the main sample and equals 25.1 years. Individuals in an intact marriage had 
on average 0.42 more children conceived during first marriage than those whose 
marriage ended, although this may simply be due to the fact that we observe them 
longer, as they did not divorce during the sample period (see Table 2). This evidence 
confirms the importance of allowing for the endogeneity of children in the model. Both 
the own and the partner’s level of education are on average higher for individuals in 
intact marriages than for divorcees. Individuals whose father was not in the household 
in 1979 are more represented among those who later divorce, than among those in intact 
marriages. The proportion of blacks is 10 percentage points higher among those who 
experienced marital disruption than among stable first marriages. These discrepancies 
reinforce the need to control for socio-demographic characteristics among the 
determinants of marriage instability.  
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
13 “The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) only grants access to geocode files for researchers in the United States”, as 
stated by the BLS survey documentation. See, for example, Bellido and Marcén (2014), Cáceres-Delpiano and 
Giolito (2008), Friedberg (1998) and Wolfers (2006) on the relation between regional divorce laws and social 
outcomes, such as divorce rates or fertility rates. See Appendix, Table A, for definitions of the variables used.  
16"
"
5. Results  
Children conceived before or after first marriage may have a different impact on 
marriage stability (see Section 3). It is difficult to sign a priori the direction of this 
effect. Besides, couples who anticipate their separation are likely to have fewer children 
than those who are happy together, while those who value marriage less may be more 
likely to conceive children out of marriage. Thus, in an effort to measure a causal effect, 
we adopt an instrumental variable approach and take advantage of the wealth of pre-
marital information collected by the NLSY79 to single out identifying variables that 
may affect the couple’s number of children but not their propensity to divorce. The 
latter is the requirement for valid instruments, and it is met overall by our specification 
(see discussion below). We instrument the number of children conceived before or 
during first marriage by exploiting alternative sets of instruments (see Section 3 for 
discussion): a series of dummies accounting for the number of siblings of the 
respondents, controls for the occurrence of a multiple birth, and a series of dummies 
indicating whether interviewees had their first intercourse before turning age 16, or 
between 16 and 18, or after age 18 (the reference group are individuals who had no 
intimate relations by the years 1983-1985, when respondents were between 21 and 28 
years old). We also exploit the fact that the same couple is observed many times in our 
data, to control for couple-unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. unobservable individual 
characteristics that may make someone more or less likely to be marriageable (such as 
beauty, for example, which is not recorded in the data).   
5.1 Results of estimation of the main model:  instruments validity 
The results of our estimation of the main model are given in Table 3, specification (1), 
in which the number of children conceived before and within marriage are instrumented 
using all the instruments, and we also control for individual unobserved heterogeneity.  
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Let us first of all discuss instruments validity, which relies on the instruments having a 
significant effect on the endogenous variables (the number of children conceived before 
or after marrying) but not having a direct impact on the couple’s propensity to break up.  
 The first stage regressions for the number of children conceived before and within 
marriage include all the instruments, as well as all the explanatory variables of the 
model (the later coefficients are not shown in Table 3 for the sake of readability).  
 Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that multiple births have a significant and positive 
effect on the number of children conceived during first marriage, as well as on the 
number of children conceived before first marriage. Therefore, multiple births is a good 
instrument for the number of children, but does not allow us to identify children 
conceived within marriage from children conceived before marriage. As far as the 
number of siblings of the respondent goes, all the dummies for, respectively, one, two, 
three, and four or more siblings have a significant and positive effect on children 
conceived before marriage, while only having at least four siblings affects the number 
of children conceived after marriage. This result is unexpected, and it may suggest that 
individuals coming from larger families are perhaps more likely to commit to marriage 
once they have had children. Coming to the effect of the dummies for respondent’s age 
at first intercourse, we conclude that the younger the respondent at first intercourse, the 
more likely they are to conceive children before marrying, as expected. In contrast, the 
same dummies have a significant and negative effect on the number of children 
conceived after marriage, suggesting that individuals who had intimate relations before 
age 18 are less likely to have children within marriage. Therefore, our instruments do 
not go entirely in the direction we had anticipated, but all of them significantly affect 
children conceived either before or after marriage, so that overall we can achieve 
18"
"
identification by using all these instruments, and the model passes standard 
overidentification tests (see below). 
 We tested for the validity of the instruments by running a Sargan-Hansen test 
(Baum et al. 2007), which is based on running a regression of the residuals from the 
instrumental variable model on all the instruments, and has a chi-square distribution 
under the null hypothesis of no correlation between the errors of the instrumental 
variable model and all the instruments used. A strong rejection of the null hypothesis 
would invalidate the instruments chosen. The advantage of this test is that it can also be 
run with panel data, and it is especially suited to a large set of instruments, as in the case 
of our model, as it detects possible overidentification (known also as “weak 
instruments”) problems (Baum et al. 2007).  For our preferred specification (Table 3), 
the test statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 6 degrees of freedom and it is equal to 
7.677 (with a p-value of 0.2628). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 
5% statistical significance level, and our instrumental variable specification is validated 
by this test. Clustering the repeated observations by the person identification number, 
the test statistic is distributed as a chi-square with 6 degrees of freedom and it is equal to 
9.768 (with a p-value of 0.1348) for our preferred specification (Table 3). Therefore, 
again we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% statistical significance level and our 
instrumental variable specification is again validated.  
Moreover, to be valid, the instruments should not have a direct effect on divorce 
outcomes, but should only affect marriage stability via their effect on children. One may 
for example argue that individuals who grow up in larger families are also more likely 
to have grown up in intact families, and thus having experienced more siblings could 
have a direct and positive effect on the marriage stability of the respondent. To test for 
the possibility that the number of siblings of the respondent may also affect directly the 
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respondent’s marriage stability, we estimate the effect of siblings on divorce chances for 
couples who have not yet had children. By selecting childless couples, we can neatly 
isolate the direct effect of respondent’s siblings on the couples’ divorce chances. If 
larger families with more siblings were associated with more stable marriages, and if 
individuals coming from such marriages would replicate the same behaviour as their 
parents, and are less likely to divorce, then we would find a negative and significant 
effect of the number of siblings on divorce chances, with the same holding true for 
respondents who have not yet had children. However, selecting childless couples from 
our sample of married couples, we find no direct effect of siblings on the respondent’s 
divorce probability. If we include also couples with a positive number of children in the 
sample, we find that siblings have a negative and significant coefficient on the divorce 
probability equation, but we argue that this may well be an indirect effect (since siblings 
affect respondent’s fertility, they will affect divorce via their effect on the couple’s 
number of children). Since there is no effect of siblings on the divorce rates of 
respondents who have not yet had children (childless couples), our argument is 
supported. Therefore, we believe that siblings satisfy the exclusion restriction condition 
and are a valid instrument.   
On multiple births, we test whether this variable directly affects the divorce chances 
of the respondent, and we find no significant effect. Given that the instrument is only 
available for respondents with children, here we keep all the couples in the estimation 
sample. Moreover, we find a significant and positive effect of multiple births on the 
couple’s number of children, as anticipated (Table 3). We conclude that this instrument 
also meets the validity requirement, since it does not affect the outcome variable 
(divorce), but does affect the endogenous variable in the model (number of children).  
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With respect to age at first intercourse, we run this basic test of exclusion 
restrictions, and find a direct and positive effect on couple break-up rates, as individuals 
who are more sexually active may be at greater risk of having an unstable marriage. 
However, in our data, the individual age at first intercourse has significant effects, and 
in opposite directions, on children conceived before or after the couple married (Table 
3). Once these variables are directly included in the divorce model, together with the 
instruments, the direct effect of age at first intercourse on the probability of divorce 
becomes statistically non-significant.  
As an additional robustness check, we re-estimate the model dropping age at first 
intercourse from the set of instruments, and recalculate the Sargan-Hansen test statistic, 
which is now distributed as a chi-square with 3 degrees of freedom and is equal to 3.236 
(with a p-value of 0.3566). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 5% 
statistical significance level. We conclude that, using this restricted set of instruments, 
the instrumental variable specification is also validated by this test. Let us add that the 
instruments are also significant in the first stage regressions, as required for valid 
instruments. However, under this specification, which only relies on siblings and 
multiple births to identify the effect of children conceived either before or after first 
marriage on divorce, we find that either category of child has a negative and statistically 
not significant effect on spousal divorce.  
In contrast, including only the dummies for age at first intercourse as instruments, 
the Sargan-Hansen test takes the value 0.098 and is distributed as a chi-square with one 
degree of freedom (the p-value is 0.7543); thus, the model is still identified and passes 
this test. The dummies for age at first intercourse affect significantly and positively 
(negatively) the number of children conceived before (after) marriage, and we find that 
children conceived before first marriage have a strongly significant and negative effect 
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on marriage stability, but those conceived after marriage have a negative and not 
significant effect. We then re-estimate this model variant (using only the set of age at 
first intercourse dummies as instruments), allowing only children conceived after first 
marriage to affect the divorce probability (not considering children conceived before 
marriage) and we find a strongly significant and negative effect on parental divorce 
probability (the estimated coefficient is equal to -0.50). This model also passes the 
Sargan-Hansen test and the instruments affect significantly and negatively the number 
of children conceived after first marriage. Alternatively, instrumenting only children 
conceived before first marriage with the set of age at first intercourse dummies, we find 
a strongly significant and positive effect on divorce chances (the estimated coefficient is 
equal to 0.15). This model also passes the Sargan-Hansen test and the instruments affect 
significantly and positively the number of children conceived before first marriage.  
Finally, we test for the robustness of our estimations by including some of these 
instruments separately in regressions (see Tables 11 and 12, and later in this Section 5, 
for an extensive discussion), and our main conclusion that children conceived before or 
within first marriage have opposite effects on marriage stability remains true, as long as 
we include the dummies for age at first intercourse in all such specifications.  
 To conclude, although instrumental variable models are generally considered as a 
second-best approach, in the absence of a natural experiment, it appears that our 
specification is reasonably robust. 
5.2 Results of estimation and heterogeneous effects by education, 
gender, race and gender of the first child 
Results of estimation of the main model indicate that the number of children has a 
significant effect on marital stability (Table 3, Divorce Outcome equation), which goes 
in the opposite direction for children conceived before (negative) or after marriage 
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(positive). An additional child after marriage reduces the chances of divorce by 0.192, 
while an additional child before marriage increases those chances by 0.10.  
 We also show in Table 3 the results of our estimation of similar models in which 
the number of children is not instrumented, but is treated as if it were a predetermined 
variable, exogenous to marriage breaks (specifications (2) and (3) of Table 3). In 
specification (2) we use random effects, while in specification (3) we specify individual 
fixed effects. These are alternative approaches to control for individual unobserved 
characteristics. Under both specifications, the effect of children conceived before 
marriage on divorce chances remains significantly positive, while the effect of children 
conceived within marriage remains negative and significant. However, these effects are 
much smaller in absolute value in specifications (2) and (3) than in the main model, in 
which we allow children to be determined endogenously.  
       To test for differential effects of the number of children on marital stability, 
depending on the education of the respondent, we stratify the sample by education, and 
re-estimate the model separately for each education group, distinguishing individuals 
with an intermediate education level (high school), from those with less (more) than 
high school (Table 4). Notice that the smallest group is that with less than high school 
education, for whom we find that children ‘before’ marriage have no significant effect 
on divorce rates; the estimated coefficient is, in fact, negative (though not significant), 
while children ‘within’ marriage significantly reduce the chances of divorce, with the 
effect being larger in absolute value than for higher-educated parents. For the other 
education groups, the estimates are very similar to those for the whole sample in terms 
of significance, sign, and size. Therefore, it would appear that for lesser educated 
individuals (if they are married at conception), children tend to have a slightly stronger 
marriage-stabilizing effect than for higher-educated couples.  
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Splitting the sample by the gender of the respondent (Table 5), we find similar 
results to our main model (IV specification (1) of Table 3), though the protective 
(destructive) effect of children ‘within’ (‘before’) marriage is smaller in absolute value 
for men than for women. This could be due to the compositional effect (see descriptive 
Tables).   
When splitting the results by respondent’s race (Table 6), we find no effect of 
children conceived before marriage on the chances of divorce for blacks. Moreover, the 
disruptive effect of children conceived before first marriage is much smaller for 
Hispanics than for Whites and other races. Children conceived within first marriage 
have a significant and protective effect for blacks, but the effect is smaller in absolute 
value than for Hispanics, or Whites and other races. Overall, it appears that children 
affect the marriage stability of white respondents to a greater extent.  
Finally, we consider the gender of the first child of the respondent, since prior 
studies point to the possibility that couples value differently the investment made when 
having the first child, depending on the child’s gender (Dahl and Moretti 2008; 
Lundberg and Rose 2003). In Table 7, Column (1) presents the results of estimation of 
the model for couples whose first child is a boy (the reference group are childless 
couples) while Column (2) relates to couples whose first child is a girl (the reference 
group are childless couples). Our conclusions are not affected. Children conceived 
during first marriage have a protective effect on marriage stability regardless of their 
gender while children conceived before first marriage have a deterrent effect, regardless 
of their gender. Column (3) shows the results of estimation of the model when including 
only couples who have children at some point during the sample observation period, 
and controlling for the gender of the first child by means of an additional dummy. The 
latter does not show up significant, suggesting that in our set up -having distinguished 
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children born before or after marriage- the gender of the first child does not affect 
marital stability.   
5.3 Results of estimations for different ages of children 
According to earlier studies (Vuri 2002), the deterrent effect of children on marital 
disruption is stronger when they are younger. At this point, we study the effect of 
children conceived before and within first marriage, depending on their age (Table 8). 
The first subsample (column (1)) includes childless couples and couples with only 
children aged up to 2 years old, conceived before or within first marriage. Similarly, the 
second subsample (column (2)) is formed by childless couples, and couples with only 
children conceived within or before first marriage aged 3-9 years old. The third 
subsample (column (3)) consists of childless couples, and couples with only children 
conceived within or before first marriage aged at least 10 years old.  
Our results suggest that the older the children, the lower the deterrent effect on 
marital disruption of children conceived within marriage (in absolute value); and the 
lower the destabilizing effect of children conceived before marriage. We conclude that 
our results are in line with those of the prior literature (Vuri 2002). 
5.4 Robustness checks for the main specification  
Our main results are robust to various specification checks, such as dropping childless 
couples from the sample (Table 9), controlling for many additional covariates (Table 
10), using only some subsets of the instruments (Tables 11 and 12), specifying probit 
models of divorce rather than linear probability models (Table 13), controlling for the 
presence of children rather than their specific number (Table 14), and including 
respondents of all ages at first marriage (Table 15). It should be remembered that our 
main sample only includes respondents aged at least 21 when they first marry.  
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First, we re-estimate the model after dropping from the sample those respondents 
who did not conceive any children, at least not during the sample observation period 
(Table 9). Our main conclusions are not affected, though the absolute size of the 
estimated effect of the number of children conceived before and within first marriage on 
marital stability is now smaller and equal to about half its value in our main 
specification (IV Table 3).  
Next, we carry out robustness checks for the inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables (see Table 10), that were excluded from our baseline model because of 
potential endogeneity concerns (these additional variables may be determined together 
with marriage duration). We begin by including in the regression a quadratic function of 
household income adjusted using the OECD equivalence scale, which assigns a weight 
of 1 to the respondent, a weight of 0.5 to each additional family member aged 14 or 
older, and a weight of 0.3 to each family member under age 14 (thus, for example, the 
income-scaling coefficient attributed to a two-parent family with two small children is 
2.1). Results are shown in Specification (2) of Table 10, while Specification (1) again 
shows our baseline estimates (as in the IV model of Table 3). Since individuals who 
anticipate that their marriage may break up (Johnson and Skinner 1986) may adjust their 
labor market behavior in terms of both participation and hours supplied, family income 
is likely to be endogenous to the model, and so we do not include it in our preferred 
specification. We conclude that household income affects non-linearly the probability of 
marital disruption: as family income increases, the risk of divorce first decreases and 
then rises. This is somewhat in line with prior research that shows a negative effect of 
income on the risk of divorce (Burgess et al. 2003). The effect of the number of children 
conceived before (or within) first marriage on the risk of marital disruption remains 
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positive (negative) and statistically significant and close in size to the estimates in our 
preferred specification. 
Next, we add controls for the religious background of the respondent (Vaaler et al. 
2009). Since religion establishes behaviors that are morally accepted, or rejected, if 
there is a process that jointly determines personal religious beliefs and the propensity to 
break up, then including controls for religious attitudes may bias our results. The results 
of the estimation are nevertheless robust to this check (Specification (3) of Table 10). 
As an additional robustness test, we include a dummy indicating whether the 
respondent resides in an urban or a rural area. It may be endogenous to the model if the 
probability of living in a rural or an urban area is related to fertility behavior and marital 
breakup. Our estimate on the effect of the number of children conceived before or 
within first marriage on divorce is robust to this check (Specification (4) of Table 10). 
Living in an urban area has, as expected, a positive effect on the risk of marital 
disruption, but it is not statistically significant, perhaps because, as anticipated, it may 
be correlated with fertility. 
We also control for both spouses’ employment, which we do not include in our 
main model because anticipation of divorce may affect spouses’ labor force 
participation (Johnson and Skinner 1986). The endogenous relationship between labor-
supply and fertility is well documented, for example, in Angrist and Evans (1998). We 
find that both partners’ employment actually reduces the probability of marital 
disruption. Again, the effect of children conceived before (or during) first marriage on 
the chances of divorce remains positive (negative) and statistically significant 
(Specification (5) of Table 10).  
In Specification (6) of Table 10, we include all these additional controls 
simultaneously. The negative (positive) impact of children conceived within (before) 
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first marriage on the risk of marriage break-up is comparable in size to that from our 
main specification (Specification (1) of Table 10), and remains statistically significant. 
Our conclusions are robust to dropping siblings (Table 11) or multiple births (Table 
12) from the set of instruments. In particular, the size of the estimates of interest 
remains very close to those of the main model (IV Table 3) when dropping siblings 
from the sets of instruments, but is much smaller when excluding multiple births. This 
is reasonable, since we show that multiple births have strong identification power, and 
while they significantly affect the number of children, they do not affect the chances of 
divorce of the respondents (Section 2).  
In Table 13, we adopt a probit specification of divorce to check the robustness of 
our previous linear probability models. We find that each additional child conceived 
within marriage decreases the probability of divorce by 1.2%, while each child 
conceived before marriage increases the risk of marital disruption by 0.7%.  
When modelling the presence of children (as a dummy that takes value 1 if the 
couple has a positive number of children, and zero otherwise) rather than the specific 
number of children, we find that our conclusions remain robust (Table 14).  
Finally, we select a larger sample, which also includes respondents who married 
before turning age twenty-one, leading to a sample of 8,224 individuals (Table 15). Our 
results are not substantially affected, and the estimates of interest are close to those of 
our main specification. The effect of the remaining covariates on the probability of 
marital disruption is also very similar to the main specification. 
5.5 The effect of the other covariates on the main specification 
As for the other explanatory variables, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between the age of the respondent and the risk of marital dissolution, according to 
specification (1) of Table 3. Our results also suggest that male respondents are just as 
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likely to divorce as women. Divorce probabilities also increase with the age difference 
between the spouses (Table 3), but only when the husband is older. This is in line with 
the view that a significant age gap between the spouses captures marriage ‘mismatch’ 
(see, for example, Bloemen and Stancanelli 2015). In contrast, being charged with some 
illegal activity during youth significantly increases the individual chances of marriage 
break-up. In addition, we find that the older the individual at first marriage, the lower 
the probability of subsequent marital disruption. 
"
6. Conclusions 
We study the impact of children conceived before or within first marriage on marital 
stability, by exploiting the rich information on pre- and post-marital histories of the 
participants in the NLSY, with twenty-four waves currently available. This issue is 
important, since to counteract population ageing, many OECD countries encourage 
families to have more children. However, the literature comes to controversial 
conclusions as to the direction of the effect of the presence and number of children on 
marital stability. If children hinder marital stability, as some recent studies conclude, 
then we must exercise caution in implementing pro-natal family policies.  
We focus on the time of conception rather than on actual births, to distinguish 
children conceived before or within marriage. According to the standard economic 
models, divorce occurs when the value of marriage falls short of the value of being 
single, for either or both parents. Children have their own preferences, which are usually 
unknown to the future parents, and if parents care for their children, this fact alone may 
bring considerable uncertainty into the household allocation of time and money (private 
expenditure). Children conceived before or after marriage may behave differently or 
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may be valued differently by their parents, and especially so when one of the spouses is 
a step-parent, which may add to marital conflict. 
 Since relatively ‘happier’ couples may have more children than others, it is 
important to account for the potential endogeneity of fertility decisions in a model of 
marriage break-up and, in this context, we take an instrumental variable approach. We 
exploit information on the number of siblings of the respondent, the presence of 
multiple births, and the age at first intercourse to instrument the number of children 
conceived before and within first marriage. We find a significant and sizable deterrent 
effect of young children conceived within first marriage on the risk of divorce, while 
children conceived before the couple married have the opposite effect. These 
conclusions are robust to several specification checks. According to our main model 
estimates, each additional child conceived within first marriage reduces by 0.19 the 
probability of marital disruption. In contrast, children conceived before marriage are 
found to significantly increase the probability of parental divorce by about 0.1.    
These findings can be reconciled with those of other studies in the literature that 
find a non-significant or negative effect of children on marriage stability, as for 
example, in Scandinavian countries, where cohabitation is very common (Svarer and 
Verner 2008). Thus, perhaps Scandinavian couples more closely resemble US couples 
with children conceived before first marriage.  
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Figure 1 - USA Divorce Rates by Age 
Note: Male divorce rates by age: white population, Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Female divorce rates by age: white population, Survey of Income and Program Participation.  
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Table 1 - Summary Statistics  
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Divorce 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Children conceived within marriage 1.090 1.085 0 10 
Children conceived before marriage 0.356 0.725 0 9 
Man 0.535 0.499 0 1 
Age 33.160 7.038 21 51 
Age squared 1149.108 497.092 441 2601 
Wife five years older 0.033 0.180 0 1 
Husband five years older 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Spouses of the Same age 0.776 0.417 0 1 
Highest educ.: lowest level 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Highest educ.: high school level 0.369 0.483 0 1 
Highest educ.: college level 0.247 0.431 0 1 
Highest educ.: more than college level 0.310 0.462 0 1 
Highest educ. spouse: lowest level 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Highest educ. spouse: high school level 0.386 0.487 0 1 
Highest educ. spouse: college level 0.237 0.425 0 1 
Highest educ. spouse: more than college level 0.290 0.453 0 1 
Father in household in 1979 0.679 0.467 0 1 
Without father figure in 1979 0.010 0.102 0 1 
Father out household in 1979 0.310 0.463 0 1 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Age first marriage 24.923 3.887 21 49 
Child before marriage 0.154 0.360 0 1 
Race: Hispanic 0.164 0.370 0 1 
Race: black 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Race: other 0.645 0.478 0 1 
Observations / Respondents 45441/5574    
Note: See Section 3 for more details.  
 
 
Table 2 - Summary Statistics  
 
Variables ‘Divorcee’ subsample ‘Intact marriage’ 
subsample 
Observations / Respondents 11186/2082 34255/3492 
Mean age at divorce 31.79 - 
Mean age at first marriage 24.47 25.07 
Mean number children conceived during first marriage 0.77 1.19 
Mean number children conceived before first marriage 0.51 0.31 
% with lowest level of education 10.66 6.38 
% with high level of education 44.69 34.40 
% with college level of education 26.12 24.21 
% with more than college level of education 18.53 35.02 
% with spouse lowest level of education 12.05 7.59 
% with spouse high level of education 46.68 36.02 
% with spouse college level of education 23.83 23.66 
% with spouse more than college level of education 17.43 32.74 
% with father in household in 1979 61.73 69.92 
% without father figure in 1979 1.38 0.95 
% with father out household in 1979 36.89 29.14 
% with child before marriage 22.35 13.07 
% race: black 26.28 16.74 
% race: Hispanic 17.98 15.86 
% race: other 55.74 67.40 
Note:  See Section 3 for more details.  
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Table 3 – Results of estimation of the model.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 (1) IV Model  
Divorce 
Outcome 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within  
First Stage 
Children No. 
Before  
(2) RE model 
No instruments 
for children 
(3) FE model 
No instruments 
for children 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.192***   -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.027)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Number children conceived before marriage  0.100***   0.020*** 0.094** 
 (0.019)   (0.004) (0.037) 
Man 0.002   -0.014**  
 (0.006)   (0.006)  
Age 0.101***   0.030*** 0.039*** 
 (0.012)   (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.001***   -0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.000)   (0.00002) (0.00002) 
Wife five years older -0.010   0.039***  
 (0.015)   (0.014)  
Husband five years older 0.012*   0.019***  
 (0.007)   (0.007)  
Highest education: lowest level 0.010   0.044*** -0.039** 
 (0.015)   (0.010) (0.018) 
Highest education: high school level 0.014   0.036*** -0.010 
 (0.009)   (0.007) (0.012) 
Highest education: college level 0.014**   0.032*** 0.019** 
 (0.007)   (0.006) (0.009) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.000   0.018** -0.028** 
 (0.010)   (0.009) (0.012) 
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.011   0.010* -0.013 
 (0.007)   (0.006) (0.009) 
Highest education spouse: college level -0.007   0.010* -0.001 
 (0.006)   (0.006) (0.008) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.005   -0.027***  
 (0.007)   (0.006)  
Without father figure in 1979 -0.039   -0.007  
 (0.024)   (0.026)  
Charged illegal by 1980 0.020**   0.046***  
 (0.010)   (0.010)  
Age first marriage -0.033***   -0.008***  
 (0.004)   (0.001)  
Race: Hispanic 0.002   -0.005  
 (0.008)   (0.008)  
Race: black -0.029*   0.051***  
 (0.016)   (0.008)  
Multiple birth  0.568*** 0.364***   
  (0.043) (0.021)   
One sibling  0.003 0.067***   
  (0.042) (0.021)   
Two siblings  0.049 0.096***   
  (0.041) (0.020)   
Three siblings  0.062 0.113***   
  (0.042) (0.021)   
Four or more siblings  0.112*** 0.213***   
  (0.040) (0.020)   
First intercourse before 16  -0.118*** 0.430***   
  (0.028) (0.014)   
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.117*** 0.249***   
  (0.025) (0.012)   
First intercourse after 18  -0.050* 0.117***   
  (0.028) (0.021)   
Constant -0.928*** -4.403*** -1.261*** -0.258*** -0.709*** 
 (0.119) (0.092) (0.046) (0.032) (0.034) 
Children number instrumented YES   NO NO 
Individual Random effects  YES YES YES YES NO 
Individual Fixed Effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Observations 45441 45441 45441 45441 45441 
Number of respondents 5574 5574 5574 5574 5574 
Notes: For the first stage of regressions, only the estimates of the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. 
Specifications (2) and (3) assume that children are exogenous and thus we do not instrument them. All specifications include year and 
cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4 - Results of estimation of the model for different education groups.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 Lesser 
Educated: 
Divorce 
Outcome  
Intermediate 
Education : 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Highest  
Educated:  
Divorce  
Outcome 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.204** -0.158*** -0.166*** 
 (0.097) (0.043) (0.030) 
Number children conceived before marriage  -0.028 0.117*** 0.092*** 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.030) 
Man -0.031 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.029) (0.010) (0.007) 
Age 0.096*** 0.087*** 0.093*** 
 (0.034) (0.018) (0.014) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older -0.024 0.012 -0.024 
 (0.058) (0.022) (0.020) 
Husband five years older 0.049** -0.001 0.015* 
 (0.024) (0.011) (0.009) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.057*** -0.015 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.011) (0.009) 
Without father figure in 1979 -0.016 -0.061* -0.012 
 (0.069) (0.034) (0.040) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.062** 0.026* 0.002 
 (0.026) (0.014) (0.016) 
Age first marriage -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) 
Race: Hispanic 0.021 -0.002 0.005 
 (0.035) (0.014) (0.011) 
Race: black 0.081** -0.061* -0.011 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.019) 
Same education 0.018 -0.020** -0.006 
 (0.028) (0.009) (0.007) 
Respondent more educated than spouse  -0.011  
  (0.015)  
Constant -0.831** -0.690*** -0.953*** 
 (0.371) (0.178) (0.163) 
Individual Random effects YES YES YES 
Observations 3,376 16,782 25,283 
Number of respondents 570 2,374 2,919 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. The sample of estimation is split by education level, distinguishing the 
lesser-educated interviewees from interviewees with an intermediate level of education, and those with higher level of education. First 
stages of regressions are not shown for the sake of concision (available upon request). All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 5 - Results of estimation of the model for different gender groups.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
  Men 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Women 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.165*** -0.204*** 
 (0.035) (0.039) 
Number children conceived before marriage  0.075** 0.113*** 
 (0.030) (0.024) 
Age 0.086*** 0.109*** 
 (0.014) (0.018) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older -0.033* 0.035 
 (0.020) (0.023) 
Husband five years older 0.033*** -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.012) 
Highest education: lowest level 0.014 0.001 
 (0.017) (0.026) 
Highest education: high school level 0.017 0.011 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
Highest education: college level 0.012 0.015 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.010 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.015) 
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.010) (0.011) 
Highest education spouse: college level -0.007 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.010) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.015** 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Without father figure in 1979 -0.032 -0.068 
 (0.026) (0.044) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.017 0.039 
 (0.010) (0.025) 
Age first marriage -0.028*** -0.036*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
Race: Hispanic 0.004 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Race: black -0.013 -0.038* 
 (0.023) (0.020) 
Constant -0.774*** -0.997*** 
 (0.134) (0.194) 
Individual Random effects YES YES 
Observations 24,291 21,150 
Number of respondents 3,008 2,566 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. The sample of estimation is split by the gender of the respondent. First 
stages of regressions are not shown for the sake of concision (available upon request). All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** 
Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 6 - Results of estimation of the model for different racial groups.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
 (Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 Black 
 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Hispanic 
 
Divorce 
Outcome 
White & 
other 
Divorce 
Outcome  
Number children conceived within marriage -0.087** -0.116** -0.166*** 
 (0.040) (0.047) (0.030) 
Number children conceived before marriage  -0.006 0.068** 0.219*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.043) 
Man -0.008 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) 
Age 0.047*** 0.069*** 0.092*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.014) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older 0.006 -0.041 0.010 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.019) 
Husband five years older 0.004 0.006 0.015* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) 
Highest education: lowest level 0.092*** -0.000 -0.037* 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) 
Highest education: high school level 0.057*** 0.015 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.011) 
Highest education: college level 0.043*** 0.015 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.015 0.008 -0.005 
 (0.022) (0.019) (0.014) 
Highest education spouse: high school level 0.009 0.016 -0.021** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) 
Highest education spouse: college level 0.013 -0.003 -0.011 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.027** -0.005 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.009) 
Without father figure in 1979 -0.031 0.024 -0.009 
 (0.030) (0.059) (0.039) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.043** -0.033 0.020 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.013) 
Age first marriage -0.012** -0.024*** -0.029*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) 
Constant -0.421*** -0.606*** -0.898*** 
 (0.134) (0.223) (0.149) 
Individual Random effects YES YES YES 
Observations 8,674 7,444 29,323 
Number of respondents 1,266 833 3,475 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. The sample of estimation is split by race, distinguishing Blacks, 
Hispanics, and White (the latter also including other races due to NLFS questionnaire design). First stages of regressions are not shown 
for the sake of concision (available upon request). All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** 
Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 7 - Results of estimation of the model split by sex of first child.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
  Divorce 
Outcome 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.185*** -0.194*** -0.151*** 
 (0.032) (0.038) (0.024) 
Number children conceived before marriage  0.142*** 0.115*** 0.057*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.017) 
First child conceived male   -0.001 
   (0.005) 
Man 0.005 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Age 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.085*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older 0.000 -0.026 0.008 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.015) 
Husband five years older 0.007 0.009 0.019*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) 
Highest education: lowest level -0.015 0.018 0.021 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) 
Highest education: high school level 0.006 0.018 0.017** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) 
Highest education: college level 0.017** 0.015 0.013** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.010 0.011 0.004 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) 
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.014 -0.013 -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) 
Highest education spouse: college level -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) 
Father in household in 1979 0.003 -0.007 -0.012** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.006) 
Without father figure in 1979 -0.014 -0.059* -0.036 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.022) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.020 0.032** 0.015 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) 
Age first marriage -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) 
Race: Hispanic -0.004 -0.008 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) 
Race: black -0.055*** -0.025 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.014) 
Constant -0.822*** -0.890*** -0.792*** 
 (0.125) (0.165) (0.121) 
Individual Random effects YES YES YES 
Observations 25,893 24,811 40,176 
Number of respondents 3,330 3,226 4,590 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. The sample of estimation is split by the sex of the first child, 
irrespective of being conceived before and during first marriage. Column (1) includes couples whose first child is a boy, and childless 
couples. Column (2) includes couples whose first child is a girl, and childless couples. Column (3) includes only couples who have 
children at some point, so not including childless couples. First stages of regressions are not shown for the sake of concision (available 
upon request). All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * 
Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 8 - Results of estimation of the model for different children age groups.   
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 Couples with 
at least some 
children aged 
0-2 years 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Couples with 
at least some 
children aged 
3-9 years 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Couples with at 
least some 
children aged 
10 or older 
Divorce 
Outcome 
Number children conceived within marriage 0 - 2 -0.435***   
 (0.097)   
Number children conceived before marriage 0 - 2 0.440***   
 (0.161)   
Number children conceived within marriage 3 - 9   -0.320***  
  (0.081)  
Number children conceived before marriage 3 - 9  0.189***  
  (0.059)  
Number children conceived within marriage >= 10   -0.286*** 
   (0.065) 
Number children conceived before marriage >= 10   0.098** 
   (0.045) 
Man -0.026*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Age 0.175*** 0.140*** 0.067*** 
 (0.036) (0.031) (0.011) 
Age squared -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older -0.030 -0.011 -0.004 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) 
Husband five years older -0.010 -0.004 -0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Highest education: lowest level 0.012 0.013 0.020 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.023) 
Highest education: high school level 0.016 0.042*** 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Highest education: college level 0.021** 0.045*** 0.028*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.023 -0.013 0.030* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) 
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.009 -0.020 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
Highest education spouse: college level -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) 
Without father figure in 1979 0.074* -0.024 -0.070* 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.016 0.003 0.034** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Age first marriage -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.035*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Race: Hispanic 0.020 0.003 0.010 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Race: black -0.009 -0.049* -0.034 
 (0.020) (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant -1.952*** -1.463*** -0.416*** 
 (0.421) (0.354) (0.098) 
Observations 20,044 20,216 19,044 
Number of respondents 4,589 4,689 4,261 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. The sample of estimation in Column (1) includes childless couples, and 
couples with only children aged 0-2 conceived before or within marriage. In Column (2) we include childless couples, and couples with 
only children aged 3-9 conceived before or within marriage. In Column (3) we include childless couples, and couples with only children 
aged 10 or more conceived before or within marriage. First stages of regressions are not shown for the sake of concision (available upon 
request). All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at 
the 10% level. 
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Table 9 - Results of estimation of the model: Dropping Childless Couples from the Sample 
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
 (Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
  Divorce 
Outcome 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Before 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.062***   
 (0.014)   
Number children conceived before marriage  0.049***   
 (0.015)   
Man 0.001   
 (0.003)   
Age 0.042***   
 (0.006)   
Age squared -0.0005***   
 (0.0001)   
Wife five years older 0.0004   
 (0.009)   
Husband five years older 0.015***   
 (0.004)   
Highest education: lowest level 0.019**   
 (0.008)   
Highest education: high school level 0.015***   
 (0.005)   
Highest education: college level 0.008**   
 (0.004)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.011*   
 (0.006)   
Highest education spouse: high school level 0.003   
 (0.004)   
Highest education spouse: college level 0.004   
 (0.004)   
Father in household in 1979 -0.010***   
 (0.003)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.024*   
 (0.015)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.004   
 (0.006)   
Age first marriage -0.010***   
 (0.002)   
Race: Hispanic 0.002   
 (0.004)   
Race: black 0.001   
 (0.008)   
Multiple birth  0.452*** 0.106*** 
  (0.029) (0.016) 
One sibling  -0.019 0.067*** 
  (0.034) (0.019) 
Two siblings  0.047 0.078*** 
  (0.033) (0.018) 
Three siblings  0.056* 0.101*** 
  (0.033) (0.018) 
Four or more siblings  0.097*** 0.162*** 
  (0.032) (0.018) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.093*** 0.287*** 
  (0.022) (0.012) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.096*** 0.128*** 
  (0.019) (0.011) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.019 0.051*** 
  (0.020) (0.011) 
Constant -0.466*** -5.049*** -0.651*** 
 (0.074) (0.100) (0.056) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 35,453 35,453 35,453 
Number of respondents 3,408 3,408 3,408 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification. For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of the coefficients on the 
instruments are shown for the sake of concision. All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% 
level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 10 – Results of estimation of the model: Including Additional Covariates  
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 IV model 
(1) 
Divorce 
outcome  
IV model 
(2) 
Divorce 
outcome 
IV model 
(3) 
Divorce 
outcome 
IV model 
(4) 
Divorce 
outcome 
IV model 
(5) 
Divorce 
outcome 
IV model 
(6) 
Divorce 
outcome 
Number children within marriage -0.192*** -0.202*** -0.196*** -0.185*** -0.268*** -0.271*** 
 (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.045) (0.047) 
Number children before marriage  0.100*** 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.028) 
Man 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Age 0.101*** 0.106*** 0.103*** 0.098*** 0.154*** 0.157*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife five years older -0.010 -0.029* -0.013 -0.008 0.014 0.004 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) 
Husband five years older 0.012* 0.015** 0.013* 0.011 0.014 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Highest education: lowest level 0.010 0.001 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Highest education: high school level 0.014 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.015 0.004 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) 
Highest education: college level 0.014** 0.006 0.014** 0.011 0.018* 0.013 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) 
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.011 -0.015* -0.011 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
Highest education spouse: college level -0.007 -0.014* -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Father in household in 1979 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
Without father figure in 1979 -0.039 -0.050* -0.039 -0.036 -0.056 -0.053 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034) (0.037) 
Charged illegal by 1980 0.020** 0.022* 0.021** 0.020* 0.010 0.011 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) 
Age first marriage -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.054*** -0.053*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Race: Hispanic 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
Race: black -0.029* -0.040** -0.028* -0.031* -0.030 -0.032 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) 
Family income indicator  -0.070***    -0.070*** 
  (0.013)    (0.015) 
Family income indicator squared  0.011***    0.011*** 
  (0.002)    (0.002) 
Religion raised: protestant    0.011   0.000 
   (0.015)   (0.021) 
Religion raised: roman catholic   0.015   0.010 
   (0.016)   (0.022) 
Religion raised: jewish   0.037   0.018 
   (0.029)   (0.039) 
Religion raised: other religion   0.016   0.013 
   (0.017)   (0.023) 
Living urban    -0.001  0.003 
    (0.004)  (0.006) 
Employed     -0.046*** -0.046*** 
     (0.010) (0.010) 
Spouse employed     -0.057*** -0.056*** 
     (0.011) (0.012) 
Constant -0.928*** -0.960*** -0.959*** -0.906*** -1.262*** -1.324*** 
 (0.119) (0.135) (0.127) (0.120) (0.195) (0.219) 
Individual Random effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 45441 39,625 45,344 43,305 31,161 29,799 
Number of respondents 5574 5,351 5,556 5,359 5,148 4,911 
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, IV Model Specification, which is reported in the first set of results here again, for comparison purposes. Specifications (2), 
(3), (4) and (5) include additionally among the covariates, respectively, controls for the family income and its square (2), the religion under which the interviewees 
were raised (3), whether the interviewee’s current residence is urban or rural (4), and whether the interviewee and his/her spouse are employed (5). Specification (6) 
includes all these additional controls simultaneously. First stages of regressions are not shown for the sake of concision (available upon request). All columns include 
year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 11 – Results of estimation of the model. Robustness checks: dropping siblings from the 
instruments. 
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 IV model (4) 
Divorce 
outcome  
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within 
First Stage 
Children No.  
Before  
Number children conceived within marriage -0.158***   
 (0.025)   
Number children conceived before marriage  0.121***   
 (0.019)   
Man 0.004   
 (0.005)   
Age 0.085***   
 (0.011)   
Age squared -0.001***   
 (0.000)   
Wife five years older 0.001   
 (0.014)   
Husband five years older 0.013**   
 (0.006)   
Highest education: lowest level -0.007   
 (0.014)   
Highest education: high school level 0.005   
 (0.008)   
Highest education: college level 0.010   
 (0.006)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.006   
 (0.010)   
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.012*   
 (0.007)   
Highest education spouse: college level -0.006   
 (0.006)   
Father in household in 1979 -0.003   
 (0.006)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.041*   
 (0.022)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.018*   
 (0.009)   
Age first marriage -0.029***   
 (0.003)   
Race: Hispanic -0.004   
 (0.008)   
Race: black -0.042***   
 (0.015)   
Multiple birth  0.577*** 0.365*** 
  (0.041) (0.021) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.115*** 0.425*** 
  (0.027) (0.014) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.117*** 0.244*** 
  (0.024) (0.012) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.049* 0.116*** 
  (0.026) (0.014) 
Constant -0.737*** -4.313*** -1.156*** 
 (0.114) (0.083) (0.043) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 45441 45441 45441 
Number of respondents 5574 5574 5574 
Notes: For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. 
All specifications include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at 
the 10% level. 
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Table 12 - Results of estimation of the model. Robustness checks: dropping multiple births from the instruments.  
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
 (Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 IV model 
(5) Divorce 
outcome 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within 
First Stage  
Children No. 
Before 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.336***   
 (0.080)   
Number children conceived before marriage  0.080***   
 (0.030)   
Man 0.001   
 (0.009)   
Age 0.170***   
 (0.035)   
Age squared -0.002***   
 (0.000)   
Wife five years older -0.050   
 (0.032)   
Husband five years older 0.010   
 (0.010)   
Highest education: lowest level 0.054**   
 (0.025)   
Highest education: high school level 0.033**   
 (0.013)   
Highest education: college level 0.017*   
 (0.009)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.006   
 (0.014)   
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.015   
 (0.010)   
Highest education spouse: college level -0.012   
 (0.009)   
Father in household in 1979 -0.005   
 (0.011)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.047   
 (0.038)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.018   
 (0.016)   
Age first marriage -0.051***   
 (0.010)   
Race: Hispanic 0.018   
 (0.016)   
Race: black -0.023   
 (0.023)   
One sibling  0.004 0.066*** 
  (0.055) (0.022) 
Two siblings  0.043 0.092*** 
  (0.053) (0.021) 
Three siblings  0.058 0.120*** 
  (0.053) (0.021) 
Four or more siblings  0.102** 0.231*** 
  (0.052) (0.021) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.130*** 0.458*** 
  (0.037) (0.015) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.120*** 0.265*** 
  (0.033) (0.013) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.050 0.124*** 
  (0.035) (0.014) 
Constant -1.693*** -4.566*** -1.236*** 
 (0.379) (0.104) (0.041) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 45441 45441 45441 
Number of respondents 5574 5574 5574 
Notes: For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. All 
columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 13– Results of estimation of a Probit Model of Divorce. 
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Probit Model) 
 IV model 
(6) Divorce 
outcome 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Before 
Number children conceived within marriage† -0.012***   
 (0.001)   
Number children conceived before marriage†  0.007***   
 (0.002)   
Man 0.054**   
 (0.026)   
Age 0.368***   
 (0.047)   
Age squared -0.004***   
 (0.001)   
Wife five years older -0.119*   
 (0.071)   
Husband five years older 0.077***   
 (0.029)   
Highest education: lowest level -0.130*   
 (0.078)   
Highest education: high school level 0.026   
 (0.047)   
Highest education: college level 0.091**   
 (0.038)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.077   
 (0.061)   
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.065   
 (0.042)   
Highest education spouse: college level -0.014   
 (0.039)   
Father in household in 1979 -0.022   
 (0.030)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.303***   
 (0.103)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.067   
 (0.043)   
Age first marriage -0.136***   
 (0.016)   
Race: Hispanic 0.051   
 (0.038)   
Race: black -0.352***   
 (0.082)   
Multiple birth  0.614*** 0.176*** 
  (0.024) (0.017) 
One sibling  0.020 0.069*** 
  (0.025) (0.019) 
Two siblings  0.083*** 0.099*** 
  (0.025) (0.018) 
Three siblings  0.113*** 0.111*** 
  (0.025) (0.018) 
Four or more siblings  0.177*** 0.189*** 
  (0.024) (0.018) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.081*** 0.349*** 
  (0.018) (0.013) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.099*** 0.202*** 
  (0.015) (0.011) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.016 0.097*** 
  (0.016) (0.012) 
Constant -4.785*** -3.773*** -1.142*** 
 (0.490) (0.102) (0.074) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 45441 45441 45441 
Number of respondents 5574 5574 5574 
Notes: For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. All 
columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
†Marginal estimates are shown.   
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Table 14 - Results of estimation of the model: Presence of children 
(Sample of Respondents Over Age 21 at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Model) 
 IV model 
(7) Divorce 
outcome 
First Stage 
Any Children 
Within 
First Stage 
Any Children 
Before 
Presence of children conceived within marriage -0.794***   
 (0.185)   
Presence of children conceived before marriage  0.198***   
 (0.064)   
Man 0.004   
 (0.011)   
Age 0.176***   
 (0.035)   
Age squared -0.002***   
 (0.000)   
Wife five years older -0.067*   
 (0.037)   
Husband five years older 0.007   
 (0.012)   
Highest education: lowest level 0.007   
 (0.023)   
Highest education: high school level -0.001   
 (0.015)   
Highest education: college level -0.004   
 (0.012)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level 0.014   
 (0.016)   
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.014   
 (0.012)   
Highest education spouse: college level -0.008   
 (0.010)   
Father in household in 1979 0.001   
 (0.013)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.047   
 (0.044)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.011   
 (0.019)   
Age first marriage -0.049***   
 (0.010)   
Race: Hispanic 0.022   
 (0.018)   
Race: black -0.029   
 (0.027)   
Multiple birth  0.072*** 0.045*** 
  (0.031) (0.013) 
One sibling  0.015 0.057*** 
  (0.030) (0.012) 
Two siblings  0.022 0.057*** 
  (0.030) (0.012) 
Three siblings  0.036 0.096*** 
  (0.029) (0.012) 
Four or more siblings  0.061** 0.141*** 
  (0.028) (0.012) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.057*** 0.227*** 
  (0.020) (0.008) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.049*** 0.155*** 
  (0.018) (0.007) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.045** 0.056*** 
  (0.019) (0.008) 
Constant -1.644*** -1.835*** -0.409*** 
 (0.345) (0.057) (0.023) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 45441 45441 45441 
Number of respondents 5574 5574 5574 
Notes: The Presence of children conceived within (or before) first marriage is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent has 
at least one child conceived within (or before) first marriage, and zero otherwise. For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of 
the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. All columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at 
the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 15 - Results of estimation of the model. 
(Sample of All Respondents Regardless of Age at First Marriage) 
(Dependent Variable: Risk of Marital Dissolution. Linear Probability Models) 
 IV model 
(8) Divorce 
outcome 
First Stage 
Children No. 
Within  
First Stage 
Children No. 
Before 
Number children conceived within marriage -0.169***   
 (0.021)   
Number children conceived before marriage  0.128***   
 (0.017)   
Man -0.005   
 (0.005)   
Age 0.076***   
 (0.007)   
Age squared -0.001***   
 (0.000)   
Wife five years older -0.001   
 (0.014)   
Husband five years older 0.013**   
 (0.006)   
Highest education: lowest level 0.035***   
 (0.011)   
Highest education: high school level 0.008   
 (0.008)   
Highest education: college level -0.001   
 (0.006)   
Highest education spouse: lowest level -0.018**   
 (0.008)   
Highest education spouse: high school level -0.022***   
 (0.007)   
Highest education spouse: college level -0.014**   
 (0.006)   
Father in household in 1979 -0.006   
 (0.005)   
Without father figure in 1979 -0.032*   
 (0.019)   
Charged illegal by 1980 0.027***   
 (0.008)   
Age first marriage -0.031***   
 (0.003)   
Race: Hispanic 0.000   
 (0.007)   
Race: black -0.040***   
 (0.012)   
Multiple birth  0.650*** 0.317*** 
  (0.037) (0.017) 
One sibling  -0.015 0.041** 
  (0.035) (0.016) 
Two siblings  0.040 0.071*** 
  (0.034) (0.016) 
Three siblings  0.057* 0.089*** 
  (0.034) (0.016) 
Four or more siblings  0.099*** 0.167*** 
  (0.033) (0.015) 
First intercourse before 16  -0.119*** 0.446*** 
  (0.026) (0.012) 
First intercourse between 16 and 18  -0.124*** 0.265*** 
  (0.024) (0.011) 
First intercourse after 18  -0.083*** 0.121*** 
  (0.026) (0.012) 
Constant -0.497*** -2.855*** 1.133*** 
 (0.063) (0.070) (0.033) 
Individual Random effects YES   
Observations 68,734 68,734 68,734 
Number of respondents 8,224 8,224 8,224 
Notes: For the first stage of regressions only the estimates of the coefficients on the instruments are shown for the sake of concision. All 
columns include year and cohort dummies. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table A - Definition of Variables 
(Source: NLSY79) 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
Divorce This variable takes value 0 while the interviewee is married, and value 1 the year before the divorce occurs. 
Variables of Interest  
Children conceived within marriage Number of children conceived within first marriage. 
Children conceived before marriage Number of children conceived before first marriage. 
Children conceived within marriage aged 0-2 Number of children conceived within first marriage who are aged 0-2. 
Children conceived within marriage aged 3-9 Number of children conceived within first marriage who are aged 3-9. 
Children conceived within marriage aged >=10 Number of children conceived within first marriage who are aged 10 or more. 
Children conceived before marriage aged 0-2 Number of children conceived before first marriage who are aged 0-2. 
Children conceived before marriage aged 3-9 Number of children conceived before first marriage who are aged 3-9. 
Children conceived before marriage aged >=10 Number of children conceived before first marriage who are aged 10 or more. 
Presence children conceived within marriage This variables takes value 0 when there are not children conceived within marriage, and 1 otherwise 
Presence children conceived before marriage This variables takes value 0 when there are not children conceived before marriage, and 1 otherwise 
Control Variables  
Man This variable takes value 0 for women and value 1 for men.  
Age Variable indicating the age of interviewee. 
Age squared Variable indicating the square of the age of interviewee. 
Wife five years older This variable takes value 1 if the wife is, at least, five years older than her husband and 0 otherwise.   
Husband five years older This variable takes value 1 if the husband is, at least, five years older than his wife and 0 otherwise. 
Same age This variable takes value 1 if there is an age gap between spouses of less than five years and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education: lowest level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is lower than 12th grade and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education: high school level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is the 12th grade (completed high school) and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education: college level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is between the first and the third year of college and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education: more than college level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee is the fourth year of college or more and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education spouse: lowest level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is lower than 12th grade and 0 otherwise. 
Highest education spouse: high school level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is the 12th grade (completed high school) and 0 
otherwise. 
Highest education spouse: college level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is between the first and the third year of college and 0 
otherwise. 
Highest education spouse: more than college level This variable takes value 1 if the highest level of education of the interviewee´s spouse is the fourth year of college or more and 0 otherwise. 
Father in household in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s father or stepfather is in household in 1979 and 0 otherwise. 
Father out household in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s father or stepfather is not in household in 1979 and 0 otherwise. 
Without father figure in 1979 This variable takes value 1 if respondent has no father figure in 1979 and 0 otherwise. 
Charged illegal by 1980 This variable takes value 1 if respondent has ever been charged with illegal activity, excluding minor traffic offenses, by 1980 and 0 otherwise. 
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Age at first marriage Variable indicating the age of respondent when first marriage began. 
Race: Hispanic This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is hispanic and 0 otherwise. 
Race: black This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is black and 0 otherwise. 
Race: other This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s race is other than black or hispanic and 0 otherwise. 
Region FE Dummy variables for the region of residence (North East (omitted), North Central, South, and West). 
Cohort FE Dummy variables for the cohort of respondent (from 1957 to 1964). 
Family income indicator Variable that relates the total net family income and the number and age of household members.  
Family income indicator squared This variable is the square of the previous indicator. 
Religion raised Dummy variables for the religion under which respondent was raised (protestant, roman catholic, jewish, other religion, and no religion 
(omitted)). 
Living urban This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s current residence is urban and 0 otherwise. 
Employed This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s employment status is employed and 0 otherwise. 
Spouse employed This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s spouse’s employment status is employed and 0 otherwise. 
Same education This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is the same as his/her spouse and 0 otherwise. 
Respondent more educated than spouse This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is higher than his/her spouse and 0 otherwise. 
Respondent less educated than spouse This variable takes value 1 if respondent´s education is lower than his/her spouse and 0 otherwise. 
Instrumental Variables  
No siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has no siblings and 0 otherwise. 
One sibling This variable takes value 1 if respondent has one sibling and 0 otherwise. 
Two siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has two siblings and 0 otherwise. 
Three siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has three siblings and 0 otherwise. 
Four or more siblings This variable takes value 1 if respondent has four or more siblings and 0 otherwise. 
Multiple birth This variable takes value 1 if respondent has experienced a multiple birth during first marriage and 0 otherwise. 
Intimate relations before turning 16  This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse before 16 years old. 
First Intimate relations between 16 and 18 years old This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse between 16 and 18 years old. 
First Intimate relation after 18 years old This variable takes value 1 if respondent had his/her first sexual intercourse after 18 years old.  
No Intimate relations by 1983-1985 This variable takes value 1 if respondent had not had any Intimate relations by 1983-1985.  
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